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Abstract When educational policy is supplemented by a redistributive income tax,
and when individuals differ in their ability to benefit from education, the optimal pol-
icy is typically rather regressive. Resources are concentrated on the most able indi-
viduals in order to get a “cake” as big as possible to share among individuals through
income taxation. In this paper, we put forward another reason to push for regressive
education. It is not linked to heterogeneity in innate ability but to the property that
welfare may be a convex function of an individual’s wage. For simplicity, we assume
a linear education technology and a given education budget. To give the equal wage
outcome the best chance to emerge, we also assume that individuals have identical
learning abilities. Nevertheless, it turns out that in the first-best wage inequality is
always preferable to wage equality. Even more surprisingly, this conclusion remains
valid in the second-best when the feasible degree of wage differentiation is suffi-
ciently large. This is in spite of the fact that wage equalization would eliminate any
need for distortionary income taxation.
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1 Introduction
One of the main rationales for public involvement in education is redistribution.1 In
the literature, the design of an optimal educational policy is usually combined with
that of a redistributive income tax. In that framework, education is not the only chan-
nel of redistribution; there is also in a second stage an income tax that can alter social
welfare. The government’s problem is first to determine the amount and distribution
of public education and then to design the structure of the income tax. The standard
approach is to assume a population of individuals who differ in their ability to benefit
from education. This heterogeneity typically implies a rather regressive distribution
of public education: resources are concentrated on the most able individuals in order
to get a “cake” as big as possible to share among individuals through income taxa-
tion; see, e.g., Bruno (1976), Hare and Ulph (1979), Ulph (1977), and more recently,
De Fraja (2002), Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), and Maldonado (2008). Note that
this “perverse” distribution effect just mentioned is mitigated when we introduce de-
creasing returns of educational spending.2 Naturally, if we restrict the exercise to the
first stage, the solution is also different and tends to be less regressive. This is shown
for instance by Arrow (1971), who studies the optimal distribution of a given amount
of public expenditure among individuals differing in their learning ability without
accounting for the possibility of subsequent income redistribution.
In this paper, we put forward another reason that may push for regressive educa-
tion. It is not linked to heterogeneity in innate abilities, but to the occurrence of corner
solutions in the allocation of educational resources between individuals. We show that
when individual productivities are endogenous (depend on education), welfare may
be a convex function of individual education expenditures; consequently, it may be
optimal to concentrate all resources on the education of a single individual (or type
of individual). To make it as clear as possible, we assume away differences in learn-
ing abilities, decreasing returns of education and we suppose that the total amount of
public expenditure on education is given. We shall discuss the implications of those
three assumptions in the concluding section.
This point that unequal wages are to be preferred over equal wages has been ne-
glected so far, at least in the public finance literature.3 It is, however, related to “spe-
cialization” results that have been derived in family economics. For instance, Becker
(1985) shows that educational investment produces increasing returns so that there
is a strong incentive for a division of labor even among basically identical persons.4
Becker uses this argument to explain the traditionally observed division of labor in
1Poterba (1995). Other reasons include externalities and growth; see, for instance, Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992) and Bénabou (2002).
2Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Maldonado (2008).
3Note, however, that it is implicitly acknowledged by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) who avoid it by making
suitable assumptions on the education technology.
4See also Becker (1991), Chap. 2.
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households and families (with one spouse specializing in market work while the other
one specializes in domestic activities). Our analysis differs from his in two important
respects. First, our scope is not the cooperative family but the whole society. Second,
we are concerned not only with first-best redistribution that is implicit in Becker’s
work, but also with second-best optimal solutions.
We show that when the general redistributive framework includes an education
policy that determines the distribution of wage and an optimal income tax à la Mir-
rlees, then the most unequal distribution of wages happens to be desirable from the
standpoint of social welfare maximization. In other words, in our setting, it is “more
efficient” to redistribute income rather than to equalize wages.
This rather surprising and to some extent counter-intuitive result has to be inter-
preted with great care. It does have practical relevance because the effects that are at
work in our simple setting (and the push for a corner solution) are also going to be
relevant in much more complex (and realistic) frameworks. Consequently, the advo-
cates of a progressive education policy have to show that there are benefits to wage
equalization that outweigh the nonconvexities we are putting forward. We shall re-
visit this issue in the concluding section. In the meantime, let us just point out that
our result is clearly at odds with the literature on equal opportunity that would rec-
ommend wage equality.5 In fact, we here have a trade-off between equal opportunity
and utilitarian welfare maximization6. It is also at odds with the observation that in
many countries public spending in education, but also in health is more redistributive
than income taxation. If such an observation is correct then our results suggest that
current income taxation is far from being optimal.
To keep our arguments as simple as possible, we use the two-ability version of
Mirlees’s (1971) model by Stiglitz (1982). Stiglitz studies the optimal income tax
schedule where there is a fraction ni of workers with productivity wi (i = 1,2).
Traditionally, both (n1, n2) and (w1,w2) are given. The only restriction is that w2 >
w1. Recently, there have been some attempts to study the incidence of a change in
n1/n2 over the optimal tax schedule and the extent of redistribution.7 Yet there exist
little work on the incidence of a change in w1 and w2.8
Suppose now that through its educational policy the government can choose the
vector (w1,w2) subject to some constraint n1w1 + n2w2 = E (a constant to be spec-
ified below). This amounts to assuming that wages are determined by education ex-
penditures through a linear technology and that the total education budget is given.
The natural question to ask is what is the most desirable distribution of (w1,w2) given
that whatever the vector (w1,w2) chosen there will be some redistributive taxation
policy. At first glance, one is tempted to lean toward equal wages, w1 = w2. This ap-
pears to be the most “natural” solution at least with a concave social welfare function
5Roemer (1998), Athanasiou (2007).
6Wildasin (1986) also deals with this trade-off, but in a different setting.
7Boadway and Pestieau (2007).
8There exist some studies accounting for the changes in the wage distribution, but they are conducted
in different contexts. See Battagliani and Coate (2008) (dynamic setting), Stiglitz (1982) (endogenous
change), and Brett and Weymark (2008). Brett and Weymark (2008) study the impact of changing skill
levels on everyone’s optimal consumptions and optimal marginal tax rates.
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(when society cares for equality). Furthermore with equal wages, there is no need
to resort to distortionary taxation to redistribute income. Consequently, a first-best
policy is attainable.
We show that this intuitive argument is wrong and that the optimal distribution
of abilities is the most unequal one. In the first-best, we start with the special case
of quasilinear preferences, and show that individual utility is a convex function of
w, so that the equal wage solution is a local social welfare minimum. By endowing
one type of individual with maximum ability, we get more aggregate utility than by
endowing both types with average ability. Next, we show that the result continues
to hold for general preferences. Second-order conditions are then more complicated,
but we provide a simple argument to show that wage differentiation always dominates
wages equalization.
All these results are obtained in a first-best context when there is no asymmetric
information that hinders income distribution. However, this is not the most relevant
setting to deal with the design of tax policy. The central element in the theory of
optimal taxation is information. Lack of public information on personal characteris-
tics prevents the government from levying optimum lump sum taxes and forces it to
impose taxes on income. Now, when wages are not observable in the second stage
one would expect the case for equal wages to be considerably strengthened. This
is because when wages are equalized, distortionary redistribution of incomes is not
needed. Conversely, under maximal wage differentiation efficiency losses of income
redistribution are incurred. Consequently, when wage differentiation yields the bigger
“cake,” it is not clear if it remains bigger once the incomes have been redistributed.
Quite surprisingly though it turns out that it does remain bigger. Specifically, we show
that in a second-best setting, the most unequal distribution of productivity (implying
zero productivity for one type and a positive productivity for the other type) remains
desirable. It is only when there is a positive and sufficiently large “productivity floor”
(implying an exogenous limit to wage differentiation) that an equal distribution of
productivity may become desirable in a second-best setting.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After introducing the basic model,
we first deal with the first-best setting (Sect. 3) and then with the second-best one
(Sect. 4). In Sect. 5, we present a numerical example.
2 The economy
In the line of Stiglitz (1982), we consider two types of individuals i = 1,2 with
relative size ni > 0 (so that n1 + n2 = 1) and identical utilities
u(xi, i), (1)
where xi is consumption of a numeraire good and i labor supply.9 Utility is increas-
ing in x, decreasing in  and strictly quasiconcave. Productivities (or wages) wi are
9It will become clear below that the two types are purely fictitious. We talk about transfers of earning
abilities (wages) between individuals to make the link with the Stiglitz model. This is effectively equivalent
to a setting where individuals are identical ex ante.
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endogenous and satisfy what we call the educational technology. We characterize this
technology through Γ , the set of feasible wages that is defined by
Γ = {(w1,w2)|n1w1 + n2w2 = 1 and wi ≥ w
}
with 1 ≥ w ≥ 0. (2)
In words, we have a linear technology according to which earnings ability can be
“transferred” between types on a one by one basis. To understand this formulation,
assume first that w = 0. In that case, the education technology has two extreme cases.
One is the complete equalization of wages w1 = w2 = 1 and the other is the maxi-
mum wage inequality with say w1 = 0 and w2 = 1/n2, where all educational re-
sources are devoted to type 2 individuals. The role of w is to limit the scope of wages
inequality that is feasible.
We specify the education technology in terms of wages to make the link to the
optimal taxation literature. The formalization we use may appear somewhat unusual,
but can be derived from a more conventional specification of the education technolo-
gies as it is often found in the literature. To see this, we can specify individual wages
following Ulph (1977) as wi = φi(θi, ei), where θi is (exogenous) ability to benefit
from education and ei is a “general purpose” input used in education. This is exactly
equivalent to the technology we use if (i) individuals are identical ex ante (θi is the
same for all), (ii) φ is linear in ei (for instance, wi = Aei where A is some con-
stant), and (iii) the total amount of education input is fixed at some level E (so that
n1e1 + n2e2 = E).10 In our setting, wage and education are identical. With a nonlin-
ear technology, we would have to make the distinction between the two concepts.




where ψ(·) is concave. An extreme form of ψ(·) yields the Rawlsian criterion:
W = min[u1, u2].
For the remainder of the paper, we assume for notational convenience and without
loss of generality that n1 = n2 = 1/2.
3 First-best
3.1 General problem: statement
Assume full information and free use of lump-sum transfers. The optimal allocation
is then determined by solving:
max
i ,wi ,Ti
W = Ψ [u(w11 − T1, 1)
] + Ψ [u(w22 − T2, 2)
]
, (3)
s.t. w1 + w2 = 2, (4)
10For instance, we would have w1 = θ1eα1 and w2 = θ2eα2 where θ1 = θ2 reflects different learning ability
and α ≤ 1 implies non increasing returns. In our paper, with equal proportion of the two types, e1 +e2 = 2,
α = 1 and θ1 = θ2 = 1. To be more precise, this specification yields (2) with w = 0. To generate a positive
level of w, we would have to add a constraint specifying a minimum level of ei .
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T1 + T2 = 0 (5)
wi ≥ w. (6)
This is similar to the standard first-best benchmark considered by Stiglitz (1982),
except that we have endogenous wages.11 We concentrate on the first-order condition
with respect to wi . Substituting for w2 = 2 − w1 and differentiating yields
∂W
∂w1
= (1 − 2)λ, (7)
where λ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint (5). This FOC is
always satisfied for w1 = w2 = 1 (along with 1 = 2) so that one might be tempted
to think that the solution implies equalization of wages. However, we cannot simply
assume the SOC to be satisfied here. The SOCs condition for the general problem
(with 6 decision variables) is complicated but the potential for the occurrence of
corner solutions can be illustrated by considering a special case.12
3.2 Quasilinear illustration
Assume quasilinear preferences specified by ui(xi, i) = xi − v(i). With such pref-
erences it is plain that Pareto efficiency requires the maximization of “surplus” given
by
S = w11 + w22 − v(1) − v(2). (8)
Furthermore, individual labor supplies i can be expressed solely as a function of wi
(there is no income effect). Substituting w2 = 2 −w1, we then reduce the problem to
a single dimension and write S˜(w1). Differentiating yields
dS˜
dw1








which shows that S˜(w1) is a convex function. Consequently, with quasilinear pref-
erences equalization of wages is never optimal. Instead, we have a corner solution
which involves “maximum differentiation.” Specifically, when it is feasible (i.e.,
when w = 0) one individual will have a zero wage (and not work at all) while the
other one will have a positive wage (namely wi = 2) and positive labor supply. When
w > 0, this extreme solution is not feasible. However, it continues to be true that
wages ought to be differentiated as much as possible.
11As a matter of fact, Stiglitz allows for variable wage rates that are generated by a production technology.
12There exist some work (see, e.g., Booth and Coles 2007, 2009) which stresses, in another framework
(more in the line of Becker’s different home and market productivity), the increasing returns in human
capital accumulation in the “broad” sense, that is, taking into account the product between education and
labor supply.
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To sum up, the maximal wage differentiation maximizes the size of total surplus
and thus applies at all Pareto efficient allocations. When Ψ is strictly concave, social
welfare is maximized when utilities are equalized. This is achieved through lump-
sump transfers. Recall that we are in a first-best world for the time being so that
redistribution (of incomes) does not involve any efficiency loss.
We now return to the case with general preferences and show that maximum dif-
ferentiation continues to be optimal. However, the proof is more complicated than in
the quasilinear case.
3.3 General problem: solution
With general preferences we can no longer reduce the problem to a single dimension
and the SOCs are too complicated to be conclusive. However, we can use a differ-
ent approach and directly compare the relevant levels of welfare. We first compare
WI (achieved when w1 = w2 = 1) and WC (achieved when, say, w1 = (2 − w) and
w2 = w), and show that WC ≥ WI so that maximum differentiation continues to
dominate wage equalization even with general preferences.
To see this, define the level of labor supply under wage (and consumption) equal-
ization





] + Ψ [u(, )]. (11)
Maximum welfare is then given by
WI = Ψ [u(I , I )] + Ψ [u(I , I )]. (12)






u(w11 − T , 1)
] + Ψ [u(w22 + T , 2)
]
, (13)
where T is a lump-sum transfer. By setting T to equalize consumption levels (which




















By setting 1 = 2 = I (which is again generally not optimal) and using w1 = (2 −
w) and w2 = w we then obtain
WC ≥ Ψ [u(I , I )] + Ψ [u(I , I )] = WI . (14)
Consequently, the corner solution dominates wage equalization. This is because for
w1 = (2 − w) and w2 = w there are feasible choices of labor supplies and transfers
which yield (at least) the same level of welfare as under wage equalization.
13Unless, for instance, Ψ is linear while u is strongly separable.
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Our argument effectively implies that any allocation with unequal wages (on the
wage frontier) dominates that with equal wages. To complete the proof that there is a
corner solution, we have to show that there is no interior solution with w1 = w2 < w.
It follows from (7) that an interior solution must be such that 1 = 2. But by using an
argument similar to the one used for w1 = w2 = 1 one can easily show that the corner
solution w1 = (2 − w) and w2 = w dominates the (candidate) interior solution.14
To sum up, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume that preferences are represented by the general utility function
ui(xi, i), that wages can be chosen according to w1 + w2 = 2, with wi ≥ w and
that the social welfare function is symmetric and concave. When individual types are
observable (so that personalized lump-sum transfers are available) the highest level
of welfare is achieved by maximum wage differentiation (with wi = w and wj =
2 − w).
In words, in a first-best setting, equalization of wages (according to the linear
technology considered here) is at best useless and generally yields a reduction in
welfare. Roughly speaking, the best strategy is thus to redistribute incomes rather than
abilities. Recall that with the linear education technology considered, redistribution
of abilities does not involve any efficiency loss per se (the total cake does not become
smaller). Yet, it proves not to be desirable.
Even though this result may at first seem surprising, the intuition becomes obvi-
ous under closer scrutiny. Consider the simplest case with w = 0. Then, if we go from
equal wages to say w2 = 2, individual 2’s wage is effectively doubled. This means
that we can produce the same output as under equal wages by having only one indi-
vidual work. The proof of Proposition 1 is constructed around this argument which
becomes slightly more complicated when w > 0. The main point is that if we differ-
entiate wages from w1 = w2 = 1 to w1 = (2 − w) and w2 = w (for whatever level
of w ≥ 0) while keeping individual labor supplies unchanged (at I ) output does not
change so that the level of welfare achieved under equalization remains feasible under
differentiation.15 In other words, differentiation is at least as good as equalization.
But it is also plain that keeping labor supplies equal (and at their equal wage levels)
is generally not the best that can be done under wage differentiation. Consequently,
the differentiated solution will be strictly better than the equal wage outcome (or any
other interior allocation).
14Using a tilde to refer to the variables at this interior solution, we have
W˜ = Ψ [u(x˜1, ˜
)] + Ψ [u(x˜2, ˜
)]
,
with x˜1 + x˜2 = w˜1˜ + w˜2˜ = 2˜. This allocation remains feasible for w1 = (2 − w) and w2 = w; specif-
ically, by setting 1 = 2 = ˜, total output remains at 2˜. This established weak dominance. Strict domi-
nance obtains whenever the initial allocation is not optimal under maximal wage differentiation (which is
true except in very special cases).
15We have
w11 + w22 = (2 − w)1 + w2 = (2 − w)I + wI = 2I .
Unequal wages for equal utilities 391
Before turning to the second best, let us insist on the fact that this argument holds
for a given labor supply. In other words, the point does not rely on an “large” labor
supply of the productive individuals. From that perspective, the quasilinear specifi-
cation used in the previous subsection (as well as in Sect. 5) may be misleading. For
instance, when v() = 2/2, labor supply is given by  = w. When there are many
individuals and all the education resources are concentrated on a single person, his
labor supply seems to be “unreasonably large.” This is, however, an artifact of the
specification with quadratic disutility. When v() = − ln(1 − ), the individuals la-
bor supply is strictly less then 1.
4 The second-best
So far, we have assumed full information under which redistribution of incomes
through lump-sum taxes and transfers is possible and does not involve any efficiency
loss (we move along the Pareto frontier). This first-best result is interesting, but it is
only of limited relevance when it comes to the design of tax policies. We now turn
to a setting of asymmetric information and assume that only income yi = wii is
publicly observable, while wages and labor supplies are private information. This is
the information structure on which most of the optimal tax literature is based. In this
setting, the case for equalization of wages appears to be considerably strengthened.
Specifically, when wages are equalized, distortionary redistribution of incomes is not
needed. On the other hand, when wages are different, redistribution along the first-
best frontier may no longer be available.16 Maximal wage differentiation may then,
as shown in the previous section, yield a bigger “cake,” but it is not clear if it remains
bigger once the efficiency losses of income redistribution are incurred.
Quite surprisingly, when w = 0, maximal wage differentiation continues to domi-
nate, even in a second-best setting. We show this through two propositions. The first
one is of limited scope and applies only to some classes of utility functions. However,
it provides some interesting intuition. The second one applies to all utility functions
but is established in a more indirect way.
To specify the second-best problem, we can start from the first-best problem, (3)–
(6) to which we have to add the following two incentive constraints
u(xi, i) ≥ u(xj , ˜j ) i, j = 1,2; i = j,
where ˜j = wjj /wi is the labor supply of individual i mimicking individual j .
Observe that when wjj > 0, ˜j is only defined if wi > 0. An individual with zero
wage can never mimic an individual with positive wage (and labor supply).
Now, assume w = 0 and consider an allocation with maximum wage differen-
tiation and say w1 = 0 and w2 = 2. Assume for the time being that the first-best
allocation (solution to (3)–(6)) implies
u(x2, 2) ≥ u(x1,0), (15)
16Formally, the policy space (in the second stage) is restricted to incentive compatible mechanisms and
the tax functions that implement them.
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so that the productive individual (who works) has a utility level that is at least as
high as that of the non productive individual (who does not work). In that case, it is
plain that the first-best solution is also the second-best solution. Put differently, the
full information optimum remains implementable under asymmetric information. To
see this note that (15) implies that the incentive constraint of type 2 individuals is
satisfied because with w1 = 0, we have ˜2 = 1 = 0.17 Furthermore, with w1 = 0,
type 1 individuals cannot mimic type 2 individuals. When inequality (15) is strict, it
follows by continuity that the first-best solution continues to be implementable when
w > 0 and sufficiently small. We thus have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume w = 0. When the first-best solution with wi = 0 and wj = 2
(i, j = 1,2; i = j) implies u(xj , j ) ≥ u(xi,0), then it can also be implemented if
individual incomes are observable while wages and labor supplies are not. Further-
more, if u(xj , j ) > u(xi,0) for wi = w and wj = 2 − w (i, j = 1,2; i = j), the
first-best continues to be implementable when w > 0 but sufficiently small.
This proposition applies to a number of interesting settings. In particular, it holds
for the Rawlsian welfare function or with quasilinear preferences when Ψ is linear
(simple utilitarian criterion). However, there are also many instances where it does
not apply. A prominent and well-known example is the case of separable preferences
u(x, ) = f (x) − g(), where the first-best implies x1 = x2 so that (15) is violated
under maximum wage differentiation (i.e., the productive individual is worse off than
the unproductive individual).
When Proposition 2 applies, the first-best solution can be implemented in the
second-best. Consequently, first- and second-best solutions coincide (and both im-
ply maximum wage differentiation). When (15) is violated, the first-best solution can
no longer be implemented in the second best. However, as long as w = 0 we can
show that maximum wage differentiation continues to dominate the solution with
equal wages.
Recall that with equal wages the first-best solution is achieved with xi = i = I ,
where I is defined by (11). Since individuals are treated identically this is both a
first- and second-best solution. Now, consider again an allocation with maximum
wage differentiation and say w1 = 0 and w2 = 2. Set 2 = I and define T̂ such that
u(T̂ ,0) = u(I , I ). (16)
Observe that T̂ < I (utility being decreasing in ). It is then easy to verify that the
allocation defined by x1 = T̂ , 1 = 0, x2 = 2I − T̂ and 2 = I , is feasible, Pareto
dominates the equal wage solution xi = i = I , and is incentive compatible. Pareto
dominance follows from (16) for individual 1. For individual 2, T̂ < I implies
u(x2, 2) = u
(
2I − T̂ , I ) > u(I , I ). (17)
Finally, combining (16) and (17) yields
u(x2, 2) > u(T̂ ,0), (18)
17This continues to be true for w > 0 when inequality (15) is strict.
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which implies incentive compatibility.18 Observe that because of inequalities (17)
and (18) the argument remains valid when w > 0 and is sufficiently small. To sum
up, we have established the following proposition
Proposition 3 Assume w = 0. Under maximum wage differentiation with wi = 0
and wj = 2 (i, j = 1,2; i = j), there exists a feasible allocation defined by xi = T̂ ,
i = 0, xj = 2I − T̂ and j = I (where T̂ satisfies u(T̂ ,0) = u(I , I )) that Pareto
dominates the equal wage solution (xi = i = I ), and is incentive compatible. This
property continues to apply with w > 0 and sufficiently small.
The allocation we have constructed to establish this proposition is, of course, in
general not the optimal one, but this can only strengthen the case against wage equal-
ization.
To sum up, as long as w = 0, wage equalization is never optimal, even in the
second-best (i.e., even when it makes potentially costly ex post redistribution unnec-
essary). The case where w = 0 is admittedly extreme. We have stated Propositions 2
and 3 for this extreme case to obtain clean results. However, it is clear that as long
as we get strict inequalities both results also hold (by continuity) for w > 0 but suffi-
ciently small. However, when w > 0 and large enough the (second-best) dominance
of maximum wage differentiation can then no longer be established at the same level
of generality; we then can no longer rule out that wage equalization may be optimal in
some situations (in particular when w is close to 1 so that only “local” differentiation
is feasible). To illustrate this point, we now turn to a numerical example.
5 Numerical example
To illustrate the argument at hand, we use a quadratic disutility for labor so that the
laissez-faire implies
ui = wii − 2i /2 = w2i /2.
With a utilitarian social welfare function, social indifference curves in the plane










which corresponds to quarter circles as represented in Fig. 1.
When w1 + w2 = 2, we reach the same level S = 2 with (w1,w2) = (2,0) or
(0,2), while wage equalization w1 = w2 = 1 yields S = 1 (a local minimum). To





implies w1 + w2 = 2
√
2 > 2. Consequently, to reach the same welfare with equal
wages as with unequal wage distribution and lump-sum taxes, we need a larger total
level of human capital.19
18To establish (17), we use w2 = 2 and thus w1 = 0.
19A larger level of “total” human capital with equal wage than under unequal wages would be possible
with decreasing returns to education. See the concluding section.
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Fig. 1 Illustration with
quasilinear preferences and
quadratic disutility of labor
Fig. 2 Welfare as a function of
w2, with w1 = 2 − w2 at the
first best (solid curve) and the
second-best (dotted curve)
solutions
The level of (per capita) welfare as a function of w2, with w1 = 2 − w2 over the
range [1,2] is represented in Fig. 2. Not surprisingly, this curve is monotonically
increasing. Thus, whatever the level of w the first-best solution always implies max-
imum wage differentiation. But of course this only confirms our theoretical results
from Sect. 3.
We now turn to the second-best optimum. To tackle this problem, we maximize
(Rawlsian) welfare for a given level of w2, with w1 = 2−w2, subject to resource and
self selection constraints. The resulting level of welfare is represented on Fig. 2. Not
surprisingly first- and second-best coincide for w1 = w2 = 1. From Proposition 2, we
also expect them to coincide in the neighborhood of w2 = 2 (i.e., w1 = 0). The really
interesting feature about this welfare profile is that the curve is not monotonic. This
means that while a large wage differential (when allowed by the level of w) is always
better than wage equalization, small wage differentials may not be second-best opti-
mal. In other words, when w is large enough (more than roughly 0.8 in the example)
wage equalization is effectively the second-best solution (and dominates w1 = w and
w2 = 2 − w). Still, the example also illustrates our result that maximum differentia-
tion remains optimal when w > 0 and not “too large.” Our theoretical results do, of
course, not tell us how large w must be in order to reverse the results. Our simulation
provides an example of a case where w must be “quite large” for this to occur. While
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the orders of magnitude are of course of no practical relevance here the example nev-
ertheless makes it clear that at least in some cases the property does not just occur in
the neighborhood of w = 0.
Let us finally turn to the intuition behind the result that a small wage differentiation
may not be desirable. In the second-best, differentiating wages has two (contradic-
tory) effects. First, it is efficiency enhancing. This is shown by the fact the first-best
level of welfare is increasing in w2. However, it also brings about an informational
problem (unobservable types and the need for distortionary taxation). Interestingly,
the second-best curve is also convex which means that there are “increasing returns”
to wage differentiation. Even though the shape of the curve is example specific, it is
not surprising; recall the intuition behind Proposition 1 presented in Sect. 3. Because
of these increasing returns the efficiency gain associated with a small wage differen-
tiation is not sufficient to compensate for the adverse informational impact. However,
a large degree of differentiation yields efficiency gains that outweigh the negative
effects of information asymmetries.
6 Concluding comments
When the productivities of otherwise identical individuals can be controlled through
education expenses and when no subsequent redistribution via income taxation is
available, it is clear that the equal wage solution is very compelling. The question
raised in this paper is different. We have studied the optimal distribution of produc-
tivity under the assumption that redistribution through an optimal income tax is also
available. To give the equal wage outcome, the best chance to emerge, we have as-
sumed that individuals have identical learning abilities. Nevertheless, it turns out that
in the first best inequality is always preferable to equality. This result does not appear
to be known in the public finance literature even though it is reminiscent of “special-
ization” results obtained in family economics. Even more striking and unknown is
the fact that this property remains valid in the second best for a large class of set-
tings. Specifically, it always holds if the lower limit on productivity is not too high.
On the other hand, the result may be reversed when wage inequalities are sufficiently
restricted. Either way, the underlying problem is inherently non convex and a simple
inspection of first-order conditions can be very misleading.
Our model may at first appear to be at odds with most models of education. How-
ever, as shown in Sect. 2 it is effectively a special case of more conventional settings
which is generated by three assumptions. First, we assume that all individuals are ex
ante identical. Second, total educational spending is constant. Third, there are no in-
creasing returns in allocating this budget between individuals. Let us see what would
be the implications of relaxing these three assumptions. The assumption of uniform
learning ability effectively gives wage equalization the best chance to emerge. With
different learning ability our results could only be strengthened. The main difference
would be that the education resources would now be concentrated on the more able
individual (rather than on an arbitrary individual). Turning to the second assumption,
it appears that making educational spending endogenous would not change the main
result as long as the cost of the education input is convex. To show this, we restrict
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ourselves to the quasilinear example, but the argument can easily be generalized.
With an endogenous choice of E, social welfare (8) can be rewritten as
S = w11 + (E − w1)2 − v(1) − v(2) − C(E),
with 0 ≤ w1 ≤ E. Proceeding exactly like in Sect. 3.2, one shows that there is a corner
solution for w’s with, say, w1 = 0 and w2 = 2. An interior solution for the optimal
level of E is determined by the condition 2(E) = C′(E), as long as the second-order
condition ′2(E)−C′′(E) < 0 is satisfied (where 2(w2) denotes labor supply, which
is here evaluated at w2 = E). With ′ > 0, this requires that C is sufficiently con-
vex. For instance, when v() = 2/2 as in the example of Sect. 5, the second order
condition requires C′′(E) > 1. While based on a simple example, the arguments are
sufficient to show that a corner solution in the allocation of E between individuals
is by no means incompatible with an interior solution for E. In other words, the ar-
gument presented in this paper does not imply that society can be indefinitely rich
by choosing an arbitrarily large level of E. Decreasing returns in the individual edu-
cation technology would make a difference. Assume for the sake of illustration that
instead of w1 + w2 = 2 we have max(w1,w2) = 2, then it is clear that social opti-
mality would imply w1 = w2; see Fig. 1. This illustration also makes it clear that the
degree of decreasing returns to scale must be sufficiently strong to reverse our result.
When the set of feasible wages is convex but with a frontier sufficiently close to the
line representing w1 +w2 = 2 wage differentiation continues to be optimal. Roughly
speaking, the result is only reversed if the degree of concavity of the wage frontier





For example, when w1 = eα1 and w2 = eα2 , wage differentiation is optimal unless
α < 1/2.20
The information structure in our model also differs from that considered by other
authors (such as Bovenberg and Jacobs 2005 and Maldonado 2008). Specifically, in
our second-best setting, we assume that wages are not observable, which may ap-
pear to be odd as they result from public education.21 Implicitly, we assume that for
informational and administrative reasons the connection between the education de-









1 + η .
Exactly like in the quadratic case, a sufficiently significant degree of decreasing returns to scale is thus
required to reverse our result.
21Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Maldonado (2008) assume that individuals are heterogeneous ex ante
at the education stage. Their mechanisms (implemented by a tax function) screens for this unobservable
type and transfers can be conditioned on education choices and income. Recall that we have no asymmetric
information in the first (education) stage because individuals are identical ex ante.
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partment and the tax authorities is not perfect.22 Alternatively, our assumption can be
justified by assuming that income taxes can only be based on contemporary variables
(and not on past education records); this assumption is neither unrealistic, nor uncom-
mon in the literature. In any case, if tax authorities could use educational records, we
would fall back on the first-best setting for which our results are even stronger.
To sum up, the somehow surprising result obtained in this paper is not just a tech-
nical curiosity, but would continue to hold in a more general setting. This calls for
a number of remarks. First, it means that for people who are only concerned by the
maximization of utilitarian social welfare the concept of “equality of opportunity,”
defined as equality of earning capacity, might be undesirable.
Second, one may find unsatisfactory a society that leaves a good number of in-
dividuals without education, even when utility levels are equalized. If we think that
education brings utility by itself, and thus should be explicitly introduced in the util-
ity function, our conclusion would be different. Finally, we have to keep in mind that
for reasons pertaining to political economy redistribution through education may be
easier than tax redistribution.
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